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THE REQUIREMENT OF NOTICE TO AN EMPLOYEE OF THE TERMINATION
OR CANCELLATION' OF His GROUP POLICY
I. Introduction
Group insurance policies involve "the coverage of a number of individuals
by means of a single or blanket policy, thereby effecting economies which fre-
quently enable the insurer to sell its services at lower premium rates . .. M
This practice of insuring a group of persons by a single comprehensive policy is
a twentieth century innovation, the first policy having been written in 1911.'
At first, policies provided only life insurance benefits to employees.' Today,
however, with the phenomenal growth of group insurance, coverage may also
include total and permanent disability as well as hospitalization and surgical
expenses.4
This rapid expansion of the group policy concept has produced a host of
legal problems. A common example is that of the insured employee who, when
he presents his claim to the insurance company, discovers that his group policy
has been previously terminated or cancelled without his knowledge. The pur-
pose of this note is to define and analyze the duty of the employer or insurance
company to notify the insured employee that his group insurance policy has
been cancelled. There is a direct conflict among the various state jurisdictions
over the content and extent of this duty.
A. Scope
This note is confined to the two most prevalent ways in which an employee's
coverage under a group insurance policy can be terminated. The first method
of cancellation is simple; all group policies generally provide for termination
when the insured's employment is discontinued.5 When this occurs, most policies
with life insurance benefits contain an extremely valuable conversion privilege
which allows the former employee to convert all or part of his group insurance
to an individual policy of life insurance without showing further evidence of
insurability.6 Secondly, an employee's coverage may be altered or completely
eliminated either by a modification of the policy's terms by the employer and
the insurer or by total cancellation of the policy.7
1 Land v. West Coast Life Ins. Co., 201 Ore. 397, 270 P.2d 154, 155 (1954). For a gen-
eral discussion concerning the nature of group insurance policies, see 1 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE
LAw ANn PRACTiCE §§ 41-48 (1965); Cox, Group Insurance Contracts for Employees, 38
TExAs L. Rlv. 211 (1959); Notes and Legislation, 26 VA. L. REv. 487 (1940).
2 Cox, supra note 1, at 211.
3 Ibid.
4 In 1959, it was estimated that approximately 36 million employees in the United States
were protected by group life insurance; some 20 million were insured for total and permanent
disability; and around 44 million employees and their dependents were qualified to receive
group hospitalization and surgical benefits. Ibid.
5 Id. at 215.
6 Id. at 218.
7 E.g., Parks v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 103 F. Supp. 493 (E.D. Tenn. 1951),
aff'd, 195 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1952); Lindgren v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 57 Il. App. 2d
315, 206 N.E.2d 734 (1965); Vandenberg v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 48 N.J. Super.
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In contributory policies, where the employer and the employee both share
in the payment of premiums, the employer usually remits the full premium to
the insurance company after deducting a certain portion from the employee's
wages. In addition to the two major methods of cancellation the termination of
this type of policy may also occur upon a failure by the employee to pay his
share of the premiums.' Nevertheless, in most cases, this third method usually
appears as a hybrid form of the first two. Thus, when an employee's coverage
has ceased because of a failure to pay premiums, his discharge from employment
or a cancellation or modification of the group policy is also involved.9
B. Preliminary Considerations
Although group insurance contracts are in certain respects distinct from in-
dividual insurance policies, it has been held that the general principles of personal
insurance contract law will be binding upon one who seeks recovery under a
group policy."0 Many jurisdictions also treat the insured employee as a third
party beneficiary of the insurance contract."
The position in which the employer stands in relation to his employees and
the insurer has been the subject of much dispute. In Boseman v. Connecticut
Gen. Life Ins. Co., the Supreme Court determined that the employer was the
agent of the employee and not the insurance company."3 As Mr. Justice Butler
pointed out:
When procuring the policy, obtaining applications of employees, taking
payroll deduction orders, reporting changes in the insured group, paying
premiums and generally in doing whatever may serve to obtain and keep
the insurance in force, employers act not as agents of the insurer but for
their employees or for themselves.14
The better reasoned state decisions have followed Baseman.5 A minority of state
courts, however, have regarded the employer as an agent of the insurer.'6 In
both instances, the courts have frequently considered this issue to be of some
1, 136 A.2d 661 (1957); Poch v. Equitable Life Assur. Socy of United States, 343 Pa. 119,
22 A.2d 590 (1941).
A closely related, yet legally distinct, subject concerning the necessity of the employee's
consent to cancellation or modification will not be discussed here. For a discussion of em-
ployees' consent to the cancellation of a group policy see Note, 49 YALE L.J. 585 (1940).
8 Cox, supra note 1, at 215.
9 E.g., Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Lancaster, 219 N.E.2d 607 '(Ind. App. 1966);
Rivers v. State Capital Life Ins. Co., 245 N.C. 461, 96 S.E.2d 431 (1957); Hanaieff v.
Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y of United States, 371 Pa. 560, 92 A.2d 202 (1952).
10 Zeigler v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y of the United States, 219 Iowa 872, 259 N.W.
769 (1935); Land v. West Coast Life Ins. Co., 201 Ore. 397, 270 P.2d 154 (1954); 1 APPLE-
MAN, op. cit. supra note 1, § 41.
11 E.g., Kimbal v. Travelers Ins. Co., 151 Fla. 786, 10 So. 2d 728 (1942); Mutual Bank &
Trust Co. v. Shaffner, 248 S.W.2d 585 (Mo. 1952); Alsup v. Travelers Ins. Co., 196 Tenn.
346, 268 S.W.2d 90 '(1954).
12 301 U.S. 196 (1937).
13 Id. at 204-05.
14 Ibid.
15 E.g., Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Lancaster, 219 N.E.2d 607 (Ind. App. 1966);
Haneline v. Turner White Casket Co., 238 N.C. 127, 76 S.E.2d 372 (1953); Hroblak v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 50 Ohio L. Abs. 395, 79 N.E.2d 360 (1947).
16 E.g., Neider v. Continental Assur. Co., 213 La. 621, 35 So. 2d 237 (1948) ; Mutual Bank
& Trust Co. v. Shaffner, 248 S.W.2d 585 (Mo. 1952); Baum v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 357 P.2d 960 (Okla. 1960).
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importance in determining whether the employee is entitled to notice of termi-
nation or cancellation of his group policy.
II. Termination of Policy by Termination of Employment
A. Notice Is Not Required
In this area, courts have found little difficulty in determining that notice
is not required by either the employer or the insurer where it has been the em-
ployee who has severed his relationship with the employer.' As was stated in
Adkins v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.:'
To require that he [the employee] be given notice of a situation of which
he was already fully aware, and as to which he possessed equal or even
greater knowledge than did his employer, could serve no useful end or
purpose.1
9
Although these results seem quite justified since the employee by his own
acts has voluntarily terminated his employment, confusion has developed where
the acts of the employer or his employee do not unequivocally evince a termina-
tion of employment. Nevertheless, when there is a termination the employer pro-
ceeds to notify the insurer of an employee's discharge, and the insurer relies upon
this notice in cancelling the employee's policy. In such cases, the line of reasoning
adopted by many courts that hold notice of termination of employment or termi-
nation of the policy need not be given to the employee is that to exact such an obli-
gation would be to read into the insurance contract something that is not there.
Thus, when neither the master policy, which is in the hands of the employer, nor
the certificate of insurance, which the employee possesses, provides for such notice,
the courts have frequently refused to require it."0 What was said in Bell v. New
York Life Ins. Co.2 is indicative of the conclusions reached by these courts: "From
an examination of the certificate, we conclude that the appellants' decedent was
adequately advised of the terms of his insurance and . . .we cannot make a
new and different contract for the parties."2
17 E.g., Pearson v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y of the United States, 212 N.C. 731, 194
S.E. 661 "(1938); Waltz v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y of the United States, 233 S.C. 210,
104 S.E.2d 384 (1958); Adkins v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 130 W. Va. 362, 43 S.E.2d 372 (1947).
18 Supra note 17.
19 Id. at 378-79, 43 S.E.2d at 381.
20 E.g., Bell v. New York Life Ins. Co., 134 Ind. App. 614, 190 N.E.2d 432 (1963);
Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y of United States v. Yates, 288 Ky. 309, 156 S.W.2d 128 (1941);
Trimble v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 305 Mich. 172, 9 N.W.2d 49 (1943); Magee v. Sun
Life Assur. Co. of Canada, 182 Miss. 287, 180 So. 797 (1938); Lineberger v. Security Life
& Trust Co., 245 N.C. 166, 95 S.E.2d 501 (1956); Huston v. Travelers Ins. Co., 79 Ohio
App. 177, 70 N.E.2d 672 '(1946).
In holding that no notice to the employee was required, the Lineberger case stressed the
fact that the policy was noncontributory with the employer paying all of the premiums. Line-
berger v. Security Life & Trust Co., supra at 505. Although this distinction between contrib-
utory and noncontributory policies is frequently made when the employer and the insurer have
cancelled or modified the group policy without notice to the employee, it appears that it has
been seldom used by the courts in cases dealing with termination of the policy by cessation of
employment.
21 Supra note 20.
22 Id. at 621, 190 N.E.2d at 435.
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B. Notice Is Required
Decisions that do not require notice by either the employer or the insurer
appear to be based upon sound legal principles. A strong contention, however,
which is frequently made by the employee or his beneficiary is that failure to
receive notice has deprived him of the right to utilize his conversion privilege,
which generally must be exercised within thirty-one days after termination of
employment." If the employee has not received notice that his employment
has ended, this period will usually lapse without his knowledge. Thus, there are
strong policy considerations that militate against denying the employee some
form of notice. These considerations were aptly pointed out by the Superior
Court of New Jersey in Keane v. Aetna Life Ins. Co."4
The employer negotiated the policy. The employer assumed a substantial
administration role in the operation of the plan. The employee's knowledge
may be assumed to be comparatively meagre. Unless the employer is
charged with some obligation, a socially significant plan of protection may
be lost in the ambiguity and obscurity which may attend, and here is
claimed to have attended, the termination of the active work of the
employee2 5
At the other end of the spectrum is the seemingly justifiable reliance by the
insurer upon the employer's affirmations that an employee has ceased to work
for him.
Faced with this dilemma, several jurisdictions have begun to require that
some form of notice be given to the employee. Those courts that have recognized
this duty have generally imposed it upon the employer while allowing recovery
against the insurance company. In arriving at these results, they have emphasized
the employee's conversion privilege.2" A leading case in this area is Nick v.
Travelers Ins. Co.,27 where the employee's right to convert had been lost because,
although he was under the impression that he had been temporarily laid off from
work, the employer had actually terminated his employment." Nevertheless, the
court felt that to allow termination of the employee's policy without notice of
23 See text accompanying note 6 supra.
24 22 N.J. Super. 296, 91 A.2d 875 (1952).
25 Id. at 312, 91 A.2d at 882.
26 E.g., Emerick v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 120 Conn. 60, 179 Ad. 335 (1935);
Kolodziej v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 307 Ill. App. 657, 30 N.E.2d 916 (1940); Leavens
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 135 Me. 365, 197 Atl. 309 (1938); Geisenhoff v. John Hancock
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 209 Minn. 223, 296 N.W. 4 (1941); Nick v. Travelers Ins. Co., 354 Mo.
376, 189 S.W.2d 532 (1945); Keane v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., supra note 24; Jones v. Metropol-
itan Life Ins. Co., 156 Pa. Super. 156, 39 A.2d 721 (1944). Despite the decision in Jones, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Hanaieff v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y of United States,
371 Pa. 560, 92 A.2d 202 (1952), denied recovery to the beneficiary of a group policy from
the insurer. Although the court recognized that the employer might have a duty to inform the
insured employee that his employment had been terminated, it felt that the beneficiary did not
have a cause of action against the insurer. Jones, however, was not overruled. Accord, Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 203 Ark. 1103, 160 S.W.2d 852 (1942). See also Spartan
Aircraft Co. v. Coppick, 201 Okla. 522, 207 P.2d 790 (1949) (employer's duty does not extend
to the beneficiary).
27 Supra note 26.
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termination of employment would be to render the conversion privilege of little
value.
2 9
Similarly, Jones v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co."0 persuasively points out the
importance of an employee's conversion privilege. In Jones, the court thought
that such a provision showed an intention between the employer and the in-
surer that the former would discharge his employees only in such a manner as
would clearly indicate to them that their employment had been terminated. 1
The court reasoned that "similar considerations of justice call for notice to the
employee when his certificate is ended by the termination of employment.""2
Consequently, it stated, in order for the provision calling for termination of the
policy by termination of employment and for the conversion privilege to become
effective, the employer must clearly and unequivocally notify the employee that
he has been discharged. Until this is accomplished, for the purpose of the group
insurance policy, the employment relation between the employer and the em-
ployee was held to continue."3 By imposing this obligation upon the employer,
the court felt that it was interpreting the contract of insurance "to operate fairly
and justly as presumably the employer and the company intended." 4
It is this last concept of presumed intention that appears to run directly
counter to those earlier mentioned decisions in which the courts refused to read
into the insurance contract a requirement of notice. 5 Other jurisdictions, how-
ever, have employed this conceptL3 In Emerick v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins.
Co.,"7 the court declared that it was bound to presume that both the employer
and the insurer intended that the group policy
should operate fairly and justly to the employee and that, in return for
his acceptance of its provisions and payment to the employer of the amount
deducted from his wages as premiums, he should be assured of the benefits
apparently conferred by the policy.38
Consequently, an employee's valuable right of conversion is not terminated
simply by the employer notifying the insurer. The court reasoned that it was
the intent of neither the employer nor the insurer to so endanger the employee's
rights under the policy. Notification or knowledge of some type must also be
communicated to the employee. 9
Leavens v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,4" decided by the Supreme Court of
28 Id. at 388, 189 S.W.2d at 536.
29 Id. at 391, 189 S.W.2d at 538.
30 156 Pa. Super. 156, 39 A.2d 721 (1944).
31 Id. at 163, 39 A.2d at 725.
32 Id. at 164, 39 A.2d at 725.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 Cases cited note 20 supra.
36 Emerick v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 120 Conn. 60, 179 At. 335 (1935); Leavens
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 135 Me. 365, 197 Atl. 309 (1938). See generally Keane v.
Aetna Life Ins. Co., 22 N.J. Super. 296, 91 A.2d 875 '(1952).
37 Supra note 36.
38 Id. at 66, 179 At. at 338.
39 Id. at 68, 179 At. at 338.
40 135 Me. 365, 197 Ad. 309 (1938).
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Maine, contains this significant statement regarding the supposedly true inten-
tion of the employee and the insurer:
To hold that the employer and the insurer executed the insurance contract
with the intention that the conversion privilege assured to the employee
could be destroyed without his knowledge at the will of the employer, thus
stripping him, it may be, of the power to obtain any life insurance at a
time when he is disabled or advanced in years and no longer insurable,
is to read into the policy, we think, an unfair and unjust provision which
is neither expressed nor necessarily implied.
41
Thus, not only has the Maine court refused to adopt the principle that if no
provision for notice is found in the contract, none is required, but it has affirma-
tively stated that to do so would work a harsh and unjust result.
It can be seen that the results in Jones, Emerick, and Leavens are partially
based upon policy considerations and are in direct conflict with the holdings
found in Bell and similar cases. Those courts supporting the position argued for
by the insurer have placed particular emphasis on the explicit provisions of the
insurance contract, while those favoring the plight of the employee have pointed
to the injustice involved if the insured should lose his conversion privilege because
he was not notified that his employment had been terminated. Certainly this
latter argument is justified where the employee honestly believes his absence
from work is only temporary. At the same time, however, the reliance of the
insurer upon the employer's statements would appear equally justifiable. To
hold that the insurer presumably intended to remain liable to the employee until
the latter was notified by the employer is to impose an unwarranted interpreta-
tion upon the insurance contract. Perhaps a more equitable solution in this
area would be to impose liability upon the employer, rather than the insurer, for
failure to give notice.
III. Cancellation or Modification Between the Employer and the Insurer
One of the most frequently litigated issues involving group insurance policies
concerns whether the insured employee is entitled to be notified of the cancel-
lation or modification of the group policy. Here, the employer and the insurer
might agree to eliminate a certain provision of the contract, such as the total and
permanent disability clause,42 or the employer might notify the insurer that he
no longer wishes to continue the policy.4 In both instances, the employee may
not have received notice of these actions. Again, while little harmony exists
among the courts, the weight of authority would appear to be that notice is
required.
41 Id. at 370-71, 197 Ati. at 311.
42 E.g., Butler v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y of the United States, 233 Mo. App. 94, 93
S.W.2d 1019 (1936); Poch v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y of the United States, 343 Pa. 119,
22 A.2d 590 (1941).
43 E.g., Lindgren v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 57 Ill. App. 2d 315, 206 N.E.2d 734
(1965); Satz v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 225 S.W.2d 480 (Mo. Ct. App. 1949); Tay-
lor v. Continental Assur. Co., 104 Ohio App. 78, 144 N.E.2d 213 (1956).
[April, 1967]
A. Notice Is Not Required
Several jurisdictions that have held an employee is not entitled to notice
when the employer and the insurer have cancelled the group policy have adopted
reasoning similar to those cases involving termination of a group policy by dis-
charge from employment. Thus, unless the insurance contract somewhere pro-
vides for notice of cancellation, none will be demaided by these courts."'
Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Lancaster"s is a recent decision exemplifying
this line of reasoning. The court found the language in the contract to be clear
and unambiguous. There was no express requirement of notice to an insured
employee, nor was the court able to discover any agreement between the insurer
and the employer that such notice would be given. Finally, since the state legisla-
ture had not included in its group insurance statute a requirement of notice, the
court felt bound to declare that none was necessary.46
A second method which has been used by some courts in denying relief to
the employee is to treat the group policy solely as a contract between the em-
ployer and the insurer with the insured employee having no contractual rela-
tionship with the insurer.47 As was stated in Johnson v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co.:
"4 8
IT]he company looked exclusively to the employer for the payment of pre-
miums [although the policy was contributory] .... Since it was only the
employer who could renew, it likewise follows that it was only the employer
who could discontinue the policy, and the fact that the employee was not
given notice by the employer that such action [cancellation of the policy]
would be taken did not operate to keep alive the policy after it had been
actually terminated by agreement between the contracting parties. Notice
by the employer to the employee of the intended cancellation would have
availed nothing, since the employee could not have assumed the position
of the employer in continuing the policy in force.
49
Although the logic of Johnson seems appealing, to state that an insured is not
entitled to know of the cancellation of his group policy because he himself has
no right or power to keep the contract alive does not adequately resolve the issue.
Although the policy might not provide for a conversion privilege upon cancel-
lation or modification but only upon termination of employment, if the employee
continues to allow the employer to deduct a certain amount from his wages
supposedly for premiums and forbears from obtaining an individual policy
because he believes the group policy is still in effect, it would seem that he should
be entitled to some notice that the policy has been extinguished or amended.
44 E.g., Kimbal v. Travelers Ins. Co., 151 Fla. 786, 10 So. 2d 728 (1942); Zaunczkowski
v. Travelers Ins. Co., 3 N.J. Super. 442, 66 A.2d 463 '(1949); Taylor v. Continental Assur.
Co., supra note 43.
45 219 N.E.2d 607 (Ind. App. 1966). The facts in Lancaster are somewhat ambiguous.
However, it appears that both an attempted cancellation and a failure to pay premiums on the
part of the employer were involved. The court seemed to treat the case primarily as one that
involved a failure to pay premiums.
46 Id. at 609. For Indiana's Group Insurance Policy statute, see IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 39-
4221-24 '(1965).
47 See, e.g., Johnson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 52 Ga. App. 759, 184 S.E. 392 (1936);
Kloidt v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 18 N.J. Misc. 661, 16 A.2d 274 (1939).
48 Supra note 47.
49 184 S.E. at 395.
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B. Notice Is Required
In Taylor v. Continental Assur. Co.,5" the court denied recovery to the
beneficiary of a group insurance policy because it felt constrained by those sections
of the Ohio statute that dealt with termination of group policies and that made
no mention of a requirement of notice." In doing this, however, the court was
cognizant of the possible injustice to the employee:
We agree that it would be desirable that some notice be accorded to
employees covered by group policy of its termination so that they might
be assured of the accrual of the right to have a new policy issued to them,
but we cannot hold that the phraseology employed in the section will
permit of this construction. 2
Thus, while the Ohio court refused to exact this obligation of notice from the
insurer without legislative sanction, many jurisdictions, by emphasizing the con-
tributory nature of most group policies, have readily done so.5"
Butler v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y of the United States4 is a leading
case that upholds the insured employee's right to notice because he had been
obligated to pay a certain portion of the premiums due the insurer. The court
declared that since these contributory payments placed certain burdens upon the
employee, and his contributions constituted a part of the consideration running
to the insurer, the insurer was bound to give notification that a total and per-
manent disability provision was no longer in effect in order to preserve the benefits
guaranteed to the employee by the policy.5 Furthermore, the court reasoned
that "when a third party makes application and pays the contributions as ex-
pressed in the master policy and the same is accepted by the parties .. .such
payment and such acceptance endows the third party with a vested interest." 6
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has also adopted the Butler approach
to the issue of notice. In Poch v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y of United States5
the court did not follow those decisions denying recovery to an employee because
he was not a party to the insurance contract.5" On the contrary, the court de-
termined that at least as to the necessity of advising an employee of the cancel-
lation or modification of his group policy, a definite contractual relationship
existed between the employee and the insurer.5 9 Any attempt by the employer
50 104 Ohio App. 78, 144 N.E.2d 213 (1956).
51 Id. at 82-83, 144 N.E.2d at 216-17. OHio REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3917.06(E) and '(F)
(Page 1954) require that each group policy contain a guarantee to the employee that he may
convert his policy upon termination of employment, policy termination, or amendment.
52 Taylor v. Continental Assur. Co., supra note 51, at 83, 144 N.E.2d at 217.
53 E.g., Clauson v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 195 F. Supp. 72 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 296
F.2d 76 (1st Cir. 1961); Lindgren v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 57 Ill. App. 2d 315, 206
N.E.2d 734 (1965); Butler v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y of the United States, 233 Mo. App.
94, 93 S.W.2d 1019 (1936) ; Poch v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y of the United States, 343 Pa.
119, 22 A.2d 590 (1941). See also Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Korneghy, 37 Ala. App. 497,
71 So. 2d 292 (1954).
54 Supra note 53. But see Satz v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 225 S.W.2d 480 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1949) (distinguishing Butler on its facts).
55 Butler v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y of the United States, supra note 53.
56 93 S.W.2d at 1024.
57 343 Pa. 119, 22 A.2d 590 (1941).
58 See cases cited note 45 supra.




and the insurer to cancel the policy or eliminate a provision, except in a manner
provided by the policy, without notifying the employee would be ineffectual.
To hold otherwise might result in the insurer not exercising his ight of con-
version, if such right existed, or not seeking an individual policy elsewhere.60
These concepts of a vested interest, a contractual relationship, or the need
to allow an employee the opportunity to exercise whatever rights he might have
under the policy or at least to obtain insurance elsewhere have been applied by
courts in Tennessee, 6' Illinois,"2 Montana,6" and Massachusetts.64 In Parks v.
Prudential Ins. Co. of America,65 a federal court applying Tennessee law de-
clared that "one holding a beneficial certificate under a group policy, for which
he has paid all or a portion of the premium, has a definite contractural relation
with the insurance company." ' Therefore, to condone any attempt by the in-
surer to alter the insurance contract without notice to the employee would do
violence to the "contractual -relation."67
Likewise, in Lindgren v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,6" the Illinois court
found that the contributory payments by the insured employee conferred upon
him a vested interest in the policy that could not be defeated without notifica-
tion.69 Finally, the Montana Supreme Court in Cantrell v. Benefit Ass'n of Ry.
Employees70 expressed its concern over the possibility that an insured employee
might forbear from purchasing insurance elsewhere if he believed that his group
policy was in effect. Accordingly, to eliminate this possibility, and to enable the
employee to obtain his own policy, notice of cancellation must be given. 1
Two other theories have been enunciated by courts to require notice by
the insurance company to the insured employee. It will be recalled that while
discussing the necessity of notifying the employee that his employment and con-
sequently his group policy had been terminated, several courts developed the
doctrine of presumed intention. 2 In Vandenberg v. John Hancock Mut. Life
Ins. Co.,"' the Superior Court of New Jersey was called upon to adjudicate the
validity of a group policy amendment made between the insurer and the employ-
er without notice to the employees. The group policy was delivered in New York
and required that New York law be followed.74 Unable to find any reliable in-
dication of the law of New York on this precise question, however, the court was
forced to apply common law. 5 In so doing, it reached this important conclusion:
60 Ibid.
61 Parks v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 103 F. Supp. 493 (E.D. Tenn. 1951), aff'd,
195 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1952).
62 Lindgren v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 57 Ill. App. 2d 315, 206 N.E.2d 734 (1965).
63 Cantrell v. Benefit Ass'n of Ry. Employees, 136 Mont. 426, 348 P.2d 345 '(1959).
64 Clauson v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 195 F. Supp. 72 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 296 F.2d
76 (1st Cir. 1961).
65 103 F. Supp. 493 (E.D. Tenn. 1951).
66 Id. at 496.
67 Id. at 498.
68 57 Ill. App. 2d 315, 206 N.E.2d 734 (1965).
69 Id. at 319, 206 N.E.2d at 736.
70 136 Mont. 426, 348 P.2d 345 (1959).
71 348 P.2d at 348.
72 See text accompanying notes 29-39 supra.
73 48 N.J. Super. 1, 136 A.2d 661 (1957).
74 Id. at 3, 136 A.2d at 662.
75 Id. at 9, 136 A.2d at 666.
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The gross unfairness to an insured of effectuation of such a policy amend-
ment as that here involved without notice to the insured, under the
circumstances obtaining, while not of itself compelling a construction
precluding effectuation without notice, strongly bespeaks a contractual
intent of that tenor. It is hardly to be assumed that the Trustees and the
Insurance Company, while bestowing a valuable [conversion] privilege on the
insured with one hand, would be intending to snatch it from him, he
all unaware, with the other.
7 6
Thus, in order to preserve the employee's right to convert his group policy, the
court implied that it was not the intention of the employer and the insurer to
defeat this right without notice to the employee. It does not appear, however,
that the exact rationale of the Vandenberg decision has been followed in this
area of cancellation or modification.
The final vehicle which has been utilized to require notice to an employee is
the doctrine of estoppel. Voris v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.7 involved both a failure to pay
premiums on a contributory policy and a non-contributory one and a subsequent
cancellation of the contributory policy while the employee was absent from his
employment.7" Applying Oklahoma law, the federal court held that the insurance
company was estopped from asserting that both policies had been cancelled or
forfeited. 9 It should be noted, however, that the court based its conclusion pri-
marily on the holding that the employer was an agent of the insurer,"0 a position
maintained by a minority of state courts." Accordingly, since the employer was
acting on the insurer's behalf in collecting the premiums from the employee on
the contributory policy and remitting all payments due on both policies, the
employee was justified in believing that such a course of action would continue.
This consistent reliance by the employee entitled him to notice of any discon-
tinuance of the policies.2 The reasoning in Deese v. Travelers Ins. Co."8 is
somewhat analogous to the Voris holding. In that case, although the doctrine
of estoppel was not explicitly mentioned, the court, in requiring that notice of
policy cancellation be given by the insurer to the employee, did allude to the
reliance by the latter upon the provisions of the policy, since he continued to
pay his portion of the premiums"
IV. Conclusion
There seems to be little hope that the states will be able to reconcile their
differences concerning the duty to notify an insured employee that his group
insurance has ceased or been altered due to termination of employment or can-
cellation or modification of the policy itself. The contention of the insurer that
76 Id. at 6-7, 136 A.2d at 664.
77 26 F. Supp. 722 (N.D. Okla.), remanded per stipulation, 105 F.2d 1014 (10th Cir.
1939).
78 Id. at 724.
79 Id. at 726.
80 Id. at 725.
81 See text accompanying note 16 supra.
82 Voris v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 26 F. Supp. 722, 726 (N.D. OkIa. 1939).
83 204 N.C. 214, 167 S.E. 797 (1933).
84 Id. at 217, 167 S.E. at 799.
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he has relied upon the statements of the employer that an employee has been
discharged should not be summarily dismissed. Likewise, in a strict legal sense,
the argument that neither the master policy nor the certificate of insurance
explicitly requires notice is sound.
At the same time, there are countervailing arguments which support the
employee's position. It has been pointed out that with the possible exception
of the initiation of a contributory group policy where agents of the insurance
company explain the operations of the policy to the employee; the employee may
have no further direct contacts with the insurer. 5 Justice Prime in his dissent
in Lancaster noted that rarely does the insured read his insurance contract, and
even if he did, little knowledge would be gained.86
Mindful of these policy considerations, a number of jurisdictions have at-
tempted to mitigate the harsh results to the employee if notice is not required.
In demanding notice of termination of employment, these courts have stressed
the importance of the employee's conversion privilege. In demanding it in the
area of cancellation or modification, they have been influenced by the fact that
today most policies are contributory. This in turn has led them to find a vested
interest in the employee or a definite contractual relationship between the em-
ployer and the insurer.
One possible solution to the many questions which have arisen over this
issue of notice would be for state legislatures to include in their group insurance
statutes a requirement of notice. Until this is accomplished, the most equitable
solution is to impose liability upon the employer, rather than the insurer, for the
former's failure to notify the employee that his employment, and consequently
his group insurance policy, has been terminated. On the other hand, in the area
of cancellation or modification of the policy by the employer and the insurer,
the courts have been quite justified in requiring notice to the employee from
the employer while permitting recovery against the insurer. Since the employee
has made premium contributions to the insurer through his employer, he should
be regarded as possessing a vested interest in the contract. Therefore, until he
has been adequately notified of cancellation or modification of the policy, redress
against the insurer should be allowed.
Michael S. Williamson
85 Cox, Group Insurance Contracts for Employees,38 TExAs L. Rxv. 211, 218-19 (1959).
86 Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Lancaster, 219 N.E.2d 607, 611 (Ind. App. 1966)
(dissenting opinion).
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